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Abstract
Currently, many countries are considering the introduction of tracing software on mobile smart-
phones with the main purpose to inform and alarm the mobile app user. Here, we demonstrate
that, in addition to alarming and informing, mobile tracing can detect nearly all individuals that
are infected by SARS-CoV-2, including the notorious asymptomatic infections. Besides voluntary
reports of the infectious health status, our algorithm requires the location information of an over-
whelming part of the population and then guarantees that almost all SARS-CoV-2 infections in
that closed population can be detected. Our algorithm is based on a hidden Markov epidemic
model and recursive Bayesian filtering. The potential that mobile tracing apps, in addition to med-
ical testing and quarantining, can eradicate COVID-19 may persuade citizens to trade-off privacy
against public health.
1 Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic triggered firm lockdowns of societies and economies around the world.
Lockdown measures must be released gently and, if necessary, retightened to avoid a dramatic second
wave of COVID-19. To trace the pandemic, smartphone apps have recently received a lot of attention
[1, 2, 3]. A particular challenge to estimating the prevalence of COVID-19 are the asymptomatic
infections. Recent contact apps aim to alarm the user of a potential infection, if the user has been
close to another user with a confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection. Alarming individuals by contact apps
is a particular method of social alertness [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. If alerted, individuals are more cautious and
less likely to become infected. For a comparison of the effect of social alertness and social distancing,
we refer the reader to [9]. The awareness of potential infections may lead to eradication of the virus
[10].
The intended use of smartphone app goes beyond alarming individuals. For instance, in the
COVID Symptom Study [3], smartphone users provide their health status as a self report via an app
on a daily basis. The self reports include user information, such as age and location, and potential
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COVID-19 symptoms, such as fever or loss of smell and taste. The self-reports aid at identifying
emerging geographical hotspots of SARS-CoV-2 infections.
Previous studies [11, 12, 13, 2] consider aggregated location information, in the form of mobility
flow or population density. Here, we explore the full potential of location information for tracing the
spread of COVID-19. More precisely, we consider that the location of the majority of the population
is accessible on individual level.
2 Epidemic model
We consider the spread of SARS-CoV-2 among N individuals. At any discrete time k ∈ N, every
individual i has a viral state Xi[k] ∈ C. The set of compartments equals C = {S, E ,I,Iasym,R,Rasym}.
The state Xi[k] = S denotes that individual i is susceptible (healthy). The exposed state Xi[k] = E
denotes that individual i is infected by SARS-CoV-2 but not contagious yet. After the exposed state E ,
an individual becomes either infectious symptomatic I or infectious asymptomatic Iasym. Individuals
in either infectious state I and Iasym are contagious to susceptible individuals in their vicinity. After
some time, symptomatic infected individuals in I transition to the symptomatic removed state R,
due to recovery, quarantine, hospitalisation or death. Similarly, asymptomatic infectious individuals
transition to the asymptomatic removed state Rasym. The sole difference of the compartment R to
Rasym is that the respective individual is aware of a past infection. Removed individuals in R or Rasym
cannot infect susceptible individuals any longer. We assume that a recovered individual is immune.
Hence, multiple infections do not occur.
Throughout this work, users refer to the subset of all individuals i = 1, ..., N who voluntarily
report their health status via the smartphone app. We denote the fraction of individuals that are
users by c0 ∈ [0, 1]. Users of the app report a symptomatic infection or a recovery from COVID-19.
Furthermore, we observe location information of the individuals i = 1, ..., N . There are two possibilities
of incorporating location information. On the one hand, we could observe a neighbourhood Ni[k] of
individual i. The neighbourhood Ni[k] ⊂ {1, ..., N} specifies all individuals j 6= i that are sufficiently
close (e.g., closer than 1.5 meters) to individual i at time k. The neighbourhood Ni[k] could be
obtained from bluetooth. On the other hand, we could observe a 2 × 1 location vector zi[k] ∈ R
2.
The vector zi[k] specifies the latitude and longitude of individual i at time k and can be obtained, for
instance, by GPS. The neighbourhood of node i is obtained from the location vector zi[k] by
Ni[k] =
{
j = 1, ..., N, j 6= i
∣∣‖zi[k]− zj[k]‖2 ≤ dinf
}
(1)
for some distance dinf. The sole location information in our model are the neighbourhoods Ni[k].
We do not distinguish between neighbourhoods Ni[k] that were measured directly, by bluetooth, or
indirectly, by GPS coordinates.
We model the spread of COVID-19 by a hidden Markov model, which consists of two parts. First,
the dynamics of the viral state Xi[k]. Second, the user behaviour of reporting their viral state Xi[k].
2.1 Dynamics
An individual with a symptomatic infection traverses the viral states S → E → I → R. Analogously,
the course of an asymptomatic infection is S → E → Iasym → Rasym. An infectious individual j,
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with Xj[k] = I or Xj[k] = Iasym, infects a susceptible individual i with the infection probability β,
if individual j is in the neighbourhood Ni[k] of individual i. The infection probability β depends on
the contagiousness of SARS-CoV-2 and on the prevalence of facemasks and other spread reduction
measures. The set
Ninf,i[k] =
{
j ∈ Ni[k]
∣∣Xj [k] = I or Xj [k] = Iasym
}
consists of all infectious individuals j that are close to individual i at time k. The number of infectious
neighbours of individual i at time k is denoted by |Ninf,i[k]|. The probability of an infection of
individual i follows from potential infections by any individual j in the set Ninf,i[k] as
Pr
[
Xi[k + 1] = E
∣∣Xi[k] = S,Ninf,i[k]
]
= 1− (1− β)|Ninf,i[k]| (1− ǫ) . (2)
Here, the self-infection probability ǫ accounts for infections from an individual i other than i = 1, ..., N ,
whose location is inaccessible. Individuals leave the exposed state E with the incubation probability γ
to an infectious state,
Pr
[
Xi[k + 1] = c
∣∣Xi[k] = E
]
=


γα if c = Iasym,
γ (1− α) if c = I,
(1− γ) if c = E .
Here, α denotes the probability of an asymptomatic infection. Any symptomatic infected individual
is removed with the removal probability δ. In other words,
Pr
[
Xi[k + 1] = R
∣∣Xi[k] = I
]
= δ. (3)
For simplicity, we consider that the removal of an asymptomatic infection is the same as (3),
Pr
[
Xi[k + 1] = Rasym
∣∣Xi[k] = Iasym
]
= δ.
However, the modelling framework does allow for different removal probabilities of symptomatic and
asymptomatic infections. Denote the first time that individual i is infected by kI,i, Xi [kI,i] = I and
Xi [kI,i − 1] = E . Similarly, denote the first time that individual i is removed by kR,i. Since the
viral state compartments are in the order E → I → R, it holds that kR,i > kI,i. The sojourn time
kR,i − kI,i of state I is the number of discrete times k that individual i has been infected. By (3), we
implicitly assume that the sojourn time follows a geometric distribution with mean 1/δ.
2.2 Observations
Users of the contact app submit a health report at every time k. We denote the reported viral state of
user i as Xrep,i[k]. At every time k, the reported state Xrep,i[k] equals either healthy S, infected I, or
removed R. If user i is infected Xi[k] = I or removed Xi[k] = R, then the reported viral state equals
Xrep,i[k] = I or Xrep,i[k] = R, respectively. If the true viral state Xi[k] equals E , Iasym or Rasym, then
user i has no symptoms and reports to be healthy Xrep,i[k] = S. If user i is healthy, Xi[k] = S, then
the reported state equals either Xrep,i[k] = I, with false alarm probability pfa, or Xrep,i[k] = S, with
probability (1− pfa).
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3 Who is infected?
At time k, we would like to know: who is infected by COVID-19? In other words, for every individual i,
we would like to compute the symptomatic infection risk
Pr [Xi[k] = I |M[k] ] (4)
and the asymptomatic infection risk
Pr [Xi[k] = Iasym |M[k] ] .
Here, we formally define all observations, or measurements, up until time k as M[k]. More specif-
ically, the set M[k] specifies the reported viral state Xrep,i[l] of every user i and the neighbour-
hood Ninf,i[l] of every individual i at every time l ≤ k. In Appendix A, we propose an recursive
Bayesian filtering method to (approximately) compute the infection risks Pr [Xi[k] = I |M[k] ] and
Pr [Xi[k] = Iasym |M[k] ]. As a side product, we obtain the probabilities Pr [Xi[k] = c |M[k] ] for the
other viral states c = S, E ,R,Rasym. The computation time is polynomial in the number of individuals
N and the number of observations k.
We perform simulations of the hidden Markov model (Section 2) with N = 10, 000 individuals
and vary the fraction of app users c0. To generate the locations zi[k] at every time k, we employ
a simple movement model: For every individual i, both entries of the initial 2 × 1 location vector
zi[1] are set to a uniform random number in [0, 1]. Given the location vector zi[k] at any time k, we
obtain the location vector at the next time k + 1 as follows. With a probability of 0.8, the location
does not change, and hence zi[k + 1] = zi[k]. Otherwise, with a probability of 0.2, both entries of the
location vector zi[k + 1] are set to a uniform random number in [0, 1]. To obtain the neighbourhoods
Ni[k] from (1), we set the distance to dinf = 0.005. The curing and infection probabilities are set to
δ = 0.2 and β = 0.5, respectively. The self-infection probability is set to ǫ = 0.001, and the false alarm
probability is set to pfa = 0.05. Furthermore, we set the incubation probability to γ = 0.5 and the
fraction of asymptomatic infections to α = 0.1. For any individual i, the true initial viral state is set
to Xi[1] = I or Xi[1] = S with a probability of 0.01 and 0.99, respectively. Furthermore, we assume
that we know the true initial viral state Xi[1] of 90% randomly chosen individuals. For the other 10%
of individuals, we know only the prior distribution of the viral state Xi[1] as Pr [Xi[1] = S] = 0.99 and
Pr [Xi[1] = I] = 0.01.
Can we estimate the average number of infections? First, we define Iall[k] as the true number of
individuals whose viral state Xi[k] = I. Similarly, we define the estimated total number of infections
at time k as
Iˆall[k] =
N∑
i=1
Pr [Xi[k] = I |M[k] ] .
For the asymptomatic infections, the quantities Iasym,all[k] and Iˆasym,all[k] are defined analogously.
Figure 1 compares the estimate Iˆall[k] to the true number symptomatic infections Iall[k]. If c0 = 80%
of the population use the contact app, then the number of symptomatic infections Iˆall[k] in the
whole population is traced almost perfectly. For a user fraction of c0 = 40%, the tracing accuracy
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Figure 1: Tracing the number of symptomatic infections. The number of symptomatic infections
Iall[k] and the estimate Iˆall[k] versus time k for one realisation of the hidden Markov epidemic model.
deteriorates, but still seems acceptable. Figure 2 shows that the number of asymptomatic infections
Iasym,all[k] is traced reasonable accurate.
Can we estimate if a single individual i is infected? We have computed the posterior probability
Pr [Xi[k] = c |M[k] ] for every compartment c ∈ C. Thus, we obtain the Bayesian estimate of the viral
state Xi[k] at any time k as
Xˆi[k] = argmax
c∈C
Pr [Xi[k] = c |M[k] ] .
We define C[k] as the number of individuals i for which the estimate at time k is correct, i.e., Xˆi[k] =
Xi[k]. Figure 3 shows that the viral state Xi[k] of most individuals i is estimated correctly at any
time k, also if few people use the contact app. For instance, with a fraction of c0 = 40% users, the viral
state Xi[k] of more than 60% individuals of the whole population is estimated correctly at all times
k. Thus, provided the location zi[k] of every individual i is known, the whole population significantly
benefits from a fraction of individuals that use the contact app.
The spreading parameters α, β, δ, ǫ and γ might not be know exactly but could be estimated from
observing the viral spread [14, 15]. In Appendix B, we show that the computation of the infection
risk Pr [Xi[k] = I |M[k] ] is reasonably robust to errors in the spreading parameters estimates.
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Figure 2: Tracing the number of asymptomatic infections. The number of asymptomatic
infections Iasym,all[k] and the estimate Iˆasym,all[k] versus time k for one realisation of the hidden
Markov epidemic model.
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Figure 3: Tracing the viral state of single individuals. The number of correct viral state
estimates Xˆi[k] versus time k.
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4 Conclusions
This work considers the application of contact apps beyond alarming users of potential infections:
the detection of SARS-CoV-2 infections. We assume that the location of individuals is accessible,
but only app users report their health status. Our results indicate that, even if only a fraction of
the population use the contact app, all SARS-CoV-2 infections can be detected within a reasonable
accuracy, including asymptomatic infections and within a reasonable time period.
Data privacy regulations [16] prohibit the use of location information of individuals without their
consent. Without consent of the respective individual, location information must be processed in
aggregated or anonymised form. This work demonstrates the great value of location information
for tracing COVID-19, which is an incentive to provide location data. Furthermore, our modelling
framework can be used as basis for further work to unlock the full potential of location information,
whilst ensuring data privacy. In particular, the lack of location information could be incorporated via
the self-infection infection probability ǫ.
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A Computation of the infection risk
A.1 Assumptions in the computations
We define the N × 1 viral state vector as X[k] = (X1[k], ...,XN [k])
T . The reported viral state vector
Xrep[k] is defined analogously, where we formally set Xrep,i[k] = 0 if individual i does not use the
contact app. We rely on three assumptions to compute the infection risk (4). First, we assume the
conditional stochastic independence
Pr
[
X[k]
∣∣Xrep[k],M[k − 1]
]
≈
N∏
i=1
Pr
[
Xi[k]
∣∣Xrep,i[k],M[k − 1]
]
. (5)
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There are 6N possible combinations of the entries of the viral state vector X[k]. Thus, it is practically
impossible to state the full distribution of the vector X[k]. The assumption (5) instead implies that
the distribution of the vector X[k] can be decomposed into the marginal distribution of the entries
X1[k], X2[k], ..., XN [k], which can be computed separately. Furthermore, assumption (5) might be of
relevance to privacy: The full distribution Pr
[
X[k]
∣∣Xrep[k],M[k − 1]
]
is sensitive data. In contrast,
the single factors Pr
[
Xi[k]
∣∣Xrep,i[k],M[k − 1]
]
might in parts be made accessible to some individuals.
Furthermore, we make the assumption that the viral state Xi[k] does not depend on the infectious
neighbourhoods Ninf,1[k], ...,Ninf,N [k] at time k. More precisely,
Pr
[
Xi[k]
∣∣Xrep,i[k],Ninf,1[k], ...,Ninf,N [k],M[k − 1]
]
= Pr
[
Xi[k]
∣∣Xrep,i[k],M[k − 1]
]
. (6)
The viral state Xi[k] does depend on the neighbourhoods Ninf,1[k− 1] at the previous time step k− 1,
due to the infection probability (2). Thus, the impact of the location on the infection dynamics is
delayed by one time step, and we consider assumption (6) rather technical. Third, we assume the
analogue to (6) for the joint distribution of the random variables X1[k], ...,XN [k],
Pr
[
X[k]
∣∣Xrep[k],Ninf,1[k], ...,Ninf,N [k],M[k − 1]
]
= Pr
[
X[k]
∣∣Xrep[k],M[k − 1]
]
. (7)
A.2 Recursive Bayesian filtering
The infection risk (4) can be computed by iterating over time:
Initialisation At time k = 1, we assume that the probability distribution
Pr [Xi[1]]
is given for every individual i. Formally, we can write
Pr [Xi[1]] = Pr
[
Xi[1]
∣∣M[0]] , (8)
since there are no observations at time k = 0. (Or, the set of observation M[0] at time k = 0 is
empty, because we start measuring at k = 1.)
Measurement update We are given the distribution Pr
[
Xi[k]
∣∣M[k − 1]] for every node i. (Starting
with (8) at time k = 1.) For every user i, the measurement update incorporates the reported viral
state Xrep,i[k] to obtain a more accurate distribution of the viral state Xi[k]. For individuals i
who do not report their viral state Xrep,i[k] through the app, we formally set
Pr
[
Xi[k]
∣∣Xrep,i[k],M[k − 1]
]
= Pr
[
Xi[k]
∣∣M[k − 1]] .
For the other individuals i, whose reported state Xrep,i[k] is available, we compute the probability
Pr
[
Xi[k]
∣∣Xrep,i[k],M[k − 1]
]
with Bayes’ Theorem [17] as
Pr
[
Xi[k]
∣∣Xrep,i[k],M[k − 1]
]
=
Pr
[
Xrep,i[k]
∣∣Xi[k],M[k − 1]
]
Pr
[
Xi[k]
∣∣M[k − 1]]
Pr
[
Xrep,i[k]
∣∣M[k − 1]] .
Given the viral state Xi[k], the reported viral state Xrep,i[k] does not depend on past measure-
ments M[k − 1], and hence
Pr
[
Xi[k]
∣∣Xrep,i[k],M[k − 1]
]
=
Pr
[
Xrep,i[k]
∣∣Xi[k]
]
Pr
[
Xi[k]
∣∣M[k − 1]]
Pr
[
Xrep,i[k]
∣∣M[k − 1]] . (9)
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The distribution Pr
[
Xrep,i[k]
∣∣Xi[k]
]
is specified by the observation model in Subsection 2.2. In
particular, for Xrep,i[k] = R, it holds that
Pr
[
Xrep,i[k] = R
∣∣Xi[k] = c,M[k − 1]
]
=


1 if c = R,
0 if c 6= R.
If user i reports to be healthy, Xrep,i[k] = S, then we obtain that
Pr
[
Xrep,i[k] = S
∣∣Xi[k] = c,M[k − 1]
]
=


1 if c ∈ {E ,Iasym,Rasym},
1− pfa if c = S,
0 if c ∈ {I,R}.
Similarly, if user i reports to be infected, Xrep,i[k] = I, then it holds that
Pr
[
Xrep,i[k] = I
∣∣Xi[k] = c,M[k − 1]
]
=


1 if c = I,
pfa if c = S,
0 if c ∈ {E ,R,Iasym,Rasym}.
The denominator in (9) follows from the law of total probability [17] as
Pr
[
Xrep,i[k]
∣∣M[k − 1]] =
∑
c∈C
Pr
[
Xrep,i[k]
∣∣Xi[k] = c
]
Pr
[
Xi[k] = c
∣∣M[k − 1]] .
Time update The measurement update computes the distribution Pr
[
Xi[k]
∣∣Xrep,i[k],M[k − 1]
]
,
from which the time update obtains the distribution Pr
[
Xi[k + 1]
∣∣M[k]]. The law of total
probability yields that
Pr
[
Xi[k + 1]
∣∣M[k]] =
∑
c∈C
Pr
[
Xi[k + 1],Xi[k] = c
∣∣M[k]]
=
∑
c∈C
Pr
[
Xi[k + 1]
∣∣Xi[k] = c,M[k]
]
Pr
[
Xi[k] = c
∣∣M[k]] , (10)
where the last equation follows from the definition of the conditional probability. First, we
consider the term Pr
[
Xi[k] = c
∣∣M[k]] in (10). With the definition of the set of all observations
M[k], it holds that
Pr
[
Xi[k] = c
∣∣M[k]] = Pr [Xi[k] = c
∣∣Xrep[k],Ninf,1[k], ...,Ninf,N [k],M[k − 1]
]
.
Assumption (5) implies that
Pr
[
Xi[k] = c
∣∣M[k]] = Pr [Xi[k] = c
∣∣Xrep,i[k],Ninf,1[k], ...,Ninf,N [k],M[k − 1]
]
.
Then, with assumption (6), we obtain that
Pr
[
Xi[k] = c
∣∣M[k]] = Pr [Xi[k] = c
∣∣Xrep,i[k],M[k − 1]
]
, (11)
which has been calculated by the previous measurement update. Second, we consider the term
Pr
[
Xi[k + 1]
∣∣Xi[k] = c,M[k]
]
in (10). The transition of the viral state Xi[k] from time k to k+1
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depends on the cardinality of the infectious neighbourhoodNinf,i[k], see Subsection 2.1. However,
we do not directly observe the set Ninf,i[k] but instead the set Ni[k]. Since Ninf,i[k] ⊂ Ni[k], it
holds that
0 ≤ |Ninf,i[k]| ≤ |Ni[k]| .
Thus, we can apply the law of total probability to obtain that
Pr
[
Xi[k + 1]
∣∣Xi[k] = c,M[k]
]
=
|Ni[k]|∑
m=0
Pr
[
Xi[k + 1]
∣∣Xi[k] = c,M[k], |Ninf,i[k]| = m
]
· Pr
[
|Ninf,i[k]| = m
∣∣Xi[k] = c,M[k]
]
,
which simplifies to
Pr
[
Xi[k + 1]
∣∣Xi[k] = c,M[k]
]
=
|Ni[k]|∑
m=0
Pr
[
Xi[k + 1]
∣∣Xi[k] = c, |Ninf,i[k]| = m
]
(12)
· Pr
[
|Ninf,i[k]| = m
∣∣M[k]] .
Subsection 2.1 fully specifies the term Pr
[
Xi[k + 1]
∣∣Xi[k] = c, |Ninf,i[k]| = m
]
in (12). For in-
stance, for the susceptible compartment Xi[k] = S, we obtain that
Pr
[
Xi[k + 1] = c
∣∣Xi[k] = S, |Ninf,i[k]| = m
]
=


(1− β)m (1− ǫ) if c = S,
1− (1− β)m (1− ǫ) if c = E ,
0 otherwise.
To compute (12), it remains to determine the probabilities Pr
[
|Ninf,i[k]| = m
∣∣M[k]] for all car-
dinalities m = 0, 1, ..., |Ni[k]|. Without loss of generality
1, we assume that the neighbourhood of
individual i at time k equals
Ni[k] = {1, 2, ...,M},
where M = |Ni[k]|. The law of total probability yields that
Pr
[
|Ninf,i[k]| = m
∣∣M[k]] =
∑
c1∈C
...
∑
cM∈C
Pr
[
|Ninf,i[k]| = m
∣∣X1[k] = c1, ...,XM [k] = cM ,M[k]
]
· Pr
[
X1[k] = c1, ...,XM [k] = cM
∣∣M[k]] .
With the definition of the set of all observations M[k], we obtain that
Pr
[
|Ninf,i[k]| = m
∣∣M[k]] =
∑
c1∈C
...
∑
cM∈C
Pr
[
|Ninf,i[k]| = m
∣∣X1[k] = c1, ...,XM [k] = cM ,Ni[k]
]
· Pr
[
X1[k] = c1, ...,XM [k] = cM
∣∣Xrep[k],Ninf,1[k], ...,Ninf,N [k],M[k − 1]
]
.
1Otherwise, consider a relabelling of the nodes j in the set Ni[k].
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From assumption (7), it follows that
Pr
[
|Ninf,i[k]| = m
∣∣M[k]] =
∑
c1∈C
...
∑
cM∈C
Pr
[
|Ninf,i[k]| = m
∣∣X1[k] = c1, ...,XM [k] = cM ,Ni[k]
]
· Pr
[
X1[k] = c1, ...,XM [k] = cM
∣∣Xrep[k],M[k − 1]
]
.
With assumption (5), we obtain that
Pr
[
|Ninf,i[k]| = m
∣∣M[k]] =
∑
c1∈C
...
∑
cM∈C
Pr
[
|Ninf,i[k]| = m
∣∣X1[k] = c1, ...,XM [k] = cM
]
M∏
j=1
Pr
[
Xj [k] = cj
∣∣Xrep,j[k],M[k − 1]
]
. (13)
The set Ninf,i[k] only consists of individuals j with Xj[k] = I or Xj [k] = Iasym. For j = 1, ...,M ,
we define the Bernoulli random variable ψj as
ψj =


1 with probability pj,
0 with probability 1− pj ,
with the success probability
pj = Pr
[
Xj [k] = I
∣∣Xrep,j[k],M[k − 1]
]
+ Pr
[
Xj [k] = Iasym
∣∣Xrep,j [k],M[k − 1]
]
.
From (13) it follows that the cardinality |Ninf,i[k]| is the sum of M Bernoulli random variables
ψj ∈ {0, 1} with different success probabilities pj. Hence, the cardinality |Ninf,i[k]| follows
a Poisson binomial distribution [18]. We obtain the distribution of |Ninf,i[k]| by convolution
of the distributions of the random variables ψ1, ..., ψM . If the number M is large, then the
convolution might take long. For large M , there are more efficient algorithms [18] for computing
the distribution of the cardinality |Ninf,i[k]| (based on the discrete Fourier transform).
After the initialisation, the measurement update and the time update are alternated for every time k.
Finally, the risk factor (4) is obtained from (11) at the last time step k.
B Robustness to spreading parameter errors
We evaluate the robustness of detecting infections if the spreading parameters α, β, δ, ǫ and γ are not
exactly known. In the computations of the infection risk in Section A, we replace the exact spreading
parameters by the respective estimates αˆ, βˆ, δˆ, ǫˆ and γˆ. The spreading parameter estimates are subject
to random 10% relative errors. For instance, the infection probability estimate βˆ is a uniform random
number in [0.9β, 1.1β]. Except for the spreading parameters, all parameters are set to the same values
as in Section 3. Figures 4 to 6 show that tracing the infections with errors on the spreading parameters
performs moderately worse than the simulations without errors in Section 3. Thus, the computation
of the infection risk is relatively robust.
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Figure 4: Tracing the number of symptomatic infections with spreading parameter errors.
The number of symptomatic infections Iall[k] and the estimate Iˆall[k] versus time k for one realisation
of the hidden Markov epidemic model and 10% relative errors on the spreading parameters.
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Figure 5: Tracing the number of asymptomatic infections with spreading parameter errors.
The number of asymptomatic infections Iasym,all[k] and the estimate Iˆasym,all[k] versus time k for one
realisation of the hidden Markov epidemic model and 10% relative errors on the spreading parameters.
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Figure 6: Tracing the viral state of single individuals with spreading parameter errors. The
number of correct viral state estimates Xˆi[k] versus time k and 10% relative errors on the spreading
parameters.
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